Aging, fertility, social security and political equilibrium |
| |
Authors: | Makoto Hirazawa Koji Kitaura Akira Yakita |
| |
Institution: | (1) Graduate School of Economics, Chukyo University, 101-2 Yagoto-Honmachi, Showa-ku Nagoya, 466-8666, Japan;(2) Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba 305-8573, Japan;; |
| |
Abstract: | We analyze the effect of population aging on the political choice of the size of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system,
incorporating the heterogeneity of individuals in their preference for having children, and hence the endogenous fertility
choices of individuals, into a simple overlapping generations model. We show that population aging may result in an increase
in the contribution rate, increasing the share of the retired population who prefer a higher contribution rate; and that,
if the system involves redistribution between retirees with different contributions, the increased contribution rate raises
the number of individuals who have children, i.e., future contributors. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|