Endogenous Voting Agendas |
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Authors: | John Duggan |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Political Science and Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA;(2) Wallis Institute of Political Economy, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA |
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Abstract: | Existence of a “simple” pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium is established in a model of endogenous agenda formation and sophisticated voting; upper hemicontinuity of simple equilibrium outcomes is demonstrated; and connections to the set of undominated, or “core,” alternatives are examined. In one dimension with single-peaked preferences, the simple equilibrium outcome is essentially unique and lies in the core, providing a game-theoretic foundation for the median voter theorem in terms of endogenous agenda setting. Existence of equilibrium relies on a general characterization of sophisticated voting outcomes in the presence of “majority-ties,” rather than the standard tie-breaking convention in voting subgames in favor of the alternative proposed later. The model is illustrated in a three-agent distributive politics setting, and it is shown there that the standard tie-breaking convention leads to non-existence of equilibrium. |
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