| 基于两维度相对业绩比较的经营者报酬契约设计 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 徐细雄,万迪昉,梁巧转. 基于两维度相对业绩比较的经营者报酬契约设计[J]. 中国管理科学, 2005, 13(3): 115-118 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 徐细雄 万迪昉 梁巧转 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学管理学院, 陕西, 西安, 710049 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371036;70372054) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 使代理人采取最优行为的最好办法就是将其报酬和经营业绩挂钩。构建了基于二维度相对业绩比较的经营者报酬契约模型,以剔除经营者不可控的外部系统环境因素和企业内部资源质量给其带来的风险承担,并对该模型进行了简要讨论,从数理上证明了该模型相对传统经营者报酬契约模型具有帕累托效率改进。
|
| 关 键 词： | 两维度 相对业绩评价 契约 风险 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-207(2005)03-0115-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-06-09; |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-06-09 |
The Designing of Executive''''s Payment Based on Two-Dimension Relative Performance Evaluation |
| |
| XU Xi-xiong,WAN Di-fang,LIANG Qiao-zhuan. The Designing of Executive''''s Payment Based on Two-Dimension Relative Performance Evaluation[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2005, 13(3): 115-118 |
| |
| Authors: | XU Xi-xiong WAN Di-fang LIANG Qiao-zhuan |
| |
| Affiliation: | The School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China |
| |
| Abstract: | The best way to incentive agents is to bind the compensation with their operative performance.We design an executive’s compensation contract based on two-dimension relative performance evaluation,so as to eliminate risk imposed on executives by external systematic circumstance and resource of enterprise.Then we represent a brief discussion about the model and prove its Pareto-efficiency relative to traditional model. |
| |
| Keywords: | two-dimension relative performance evaluation contract risk |
| 本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
| 点击此处可从《中国管理科学》浏览原始摘要信息 |
|
点击此处可从《中国管理科学》下载全文 |
