On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates |
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Authors: | Georges Casamatta Philippe De Donder |
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Institution: | (1) Université de Toulouse I, GREMAQ-CNRS, Toulouse, France;(2) Université de Toulouse I, GREMAQ-CNRS and IDEI, Toulouse, France |
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Abstract: | We study and compare equilibrium platforms in models of unidimensional electoral competition with two and four policy motivated
parties. We first analyze the plurality game, where the party getting the most votes is elected and implements its proposed
platform. Restrictions on the set of credible announcements are needed to get existence of equilibria. Comparing equilibria
with two and four parties, we obtain that moderate parties react to the introduction of extreme parties by proposing the same
or more extreme equilibrium platforms. We then study the proportional system, where the policy implemented is a weighted sum
of the proposals, with the voting shares as weights. Here, the existence of extreme parties leads moderate ones to choose
more centrist platforms. We finally test the robustness of our results with respect to, first, the enlargement of the strategy
space to entry decisions and, second, to asymmetric distributions of voters' blisspoints.
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Keywords: | |
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