合作知识创新中基于Stackelberg博弈的资源共享决策模型

在跨组织的合作知识创新中,如何合理地分配和共享资源至关重要。本文研究了合作知识创新中的跨组织资源共享及合作维系的条件,采用博弈论方法,把合作知识创新看作是一个领导组织和多个从属组织的Stackel berg主从博弈决策模型,领导组织作为主方给出最优参与率策略,各跟随组织作为从方以总体投入以及参与率策略响应,求出了知识创新投入的均衡值、领导组织的参与、各跟随者的参与率以及创新的总体期望收益。文中指出,只有领导组织的边际收益和各从属组织边际收益之和保持最优比,合作才可能形成并有效维系。

Resource Sharing Decision Model Based on Stackelberg Game in Collaborative Knowledge Creations

For any collaborative endeavor to succeed,adequate allocation and sharing of resources are important in inter-organizational collaborative knowledge creation. The purpose of this paper is to explore the condition for resource sharing and maintaining collaboration in inter-organizational collaborative knowledgecreation. Firstly,using the game theoretic framework,the collaboration for knowledge creation is modeled as a Stackelberg leader-follower game with one leader and multi-follower. In this model,decisions are made at two stages. In the first stage,the leader sets the level of its involvement,which is called the participation rate,and in the next stage,the follower reacts to the leaders’ decision by setting an optimal value for the total efforts and respective participation rate. The equilibrium values of current efforts in knowledge creation,the leader and followers’ resource participation rate,and the total expected gain were then determined. Finally,it’s pointed out that maintaining an optimal ratio between the leader’s and followers’ marginal gains is important for the formation and continuation of the collaboration.