回购契约下供应链协调应对非常规突发事件

研究最简单的二级供应链在回购契约下是否能协调应对非常规突发事件。将市场随机需求大幅波动与零售价格随市场供求关系波动作为非常规突发事件的基本特征，并以此建立应对非常规突发事件的回购契约模型。对模型进行分析，并用算例进行验证。同时将其与无突发事件、常规突发事件状态下的供应链协调结果进行对比。研究结果表明:无突发事在基准回购契约下能实现二级供应链协调。常规突发事件与非常规突发事件在基准回购契约下不能实现供应链协调，若分别对批发价做出适当的调整，调整后的回购契约均能实现供应链协调。不人为地干预市场，回购契约下也能协调应对非常规突发事件，但会加重灾区民众的负担，此时，政府适当干预市场也是一种选择。

Supply Chain Coordination Response to Unconventional Emergencies Under Buy Back Contract

This paper investigates whether the simplest two-stage supply chain can be coordinated to respond to unconventional emergencies under the buy-back contract. The study regarded the large scale fluctuations of random market demand and the retail price fluctuating with changes in supply and demand of the market as basic features. Based on this, it analyzed the model and verified it by numerical cases. Furthermore, it compared its coordination results with those in circumstances of no emergencies and conventional emergencies respectively. It shows that the benchmark buy-back contract can coordinate the two-stage supply chain when there is no emergency, but doesn't function well when conventional and unconventional emergencies occur unless appropriate adjustments to the wholesale price of the two circumstances are made respectively. Besides, we find that, without intervening in the market, the buy-back contract can coordinate to respond to unconventional emergencies, but will add the burden to people in disaster areas, in which case proper government intervention to the market is also an option.