首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

董事会治理、管理者过度自信与企业并购决策
引用本文:雷辉,吴婵.董事会治理、管理者过度自信与企业并购决策[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2010,12(4):43-47.
作者姓名:雷辉  吴婵
作者单位:1.湖南大学 工商管理学院, 长沙 410082
基金项目:国家社会科学基金,湖南省自然科学基金 
摘    要:基于行为公司金融视角,对我国上市公司高管人员过度自信的心理特征与企业并购决策的关系进行了理论分析和实证检验。研究结果表明:管理者的过度自信与企业并购显著正相关,即管理者的过度自信是并购的重要动因之一。进一步研究发现:董事会独立性的增强并不能弱化管理者的过度自信对并购的影响;董事长和总经理两职分离的治理结构有利于弱化管理者过度自信所驱动的并购。

关 键 词:上市公司    董事会治理    管理者过度自信    并购重组
收稿时间:2010/4/10 0:00:00

Board Governance,Managerial Overconfidence and Acquisition Decision
LEI Hui and WU Chan.Board Governance,Managerial Overconfidence and Acquisition Decision[J].Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition),2010,12(4):43-47.
Authors:LEI Hui and WU Chan
Institution:1.School of Business Administration, Hunan University, Changsha 4100822.School of Business Administration, Hunan University, Changsha 410083
Abstract:The purpose of this article was to make a theoretical analysis and empirical study of the relationship between the executives'overconfident psychological characteristics in Chinese listed company and enterprises'M & A from the financial perspective of Behavioral Corporate. The results imply that executives'overconfident level is positively correlated with enterprises' mergers, which means that the executives'overconfidence is a great motivation for mergers. Further research shows that strengthened independence of the board doesn't necessarily bring about the weakening of the executives'overconfident behavior. Separating duties between the Chairman of the Board and the General Manager is beneficial for the weakening of M & A driven by executives' overconfidence.
Keywords:listed company  board governance  overconfidence  mergers and acquisitions  
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《北京理工大学学报(社会科学版)》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《北京理工大学学报(社会科学版)》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号