| 政府投资项目代建制费用控制模型的改进研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 林广利,尹贻林. 政府投资项目代建制费用控制模型的改进研究[J]. 北京理工大学学报(社会科学版), 2010, 12(4): 53-56 |
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| 作者姓名： | 林广利 尹贻林 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.天津大学 管理学院, 天津 300072 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对基于委托-代理理论传统的代建制费用控制模型所存在的不足,文章从合同价格定量化和增加处罚系数两部分入手进行模型改进研究。首先双方各自报价,利用设定的权数进行调整计算,最后确定代建合同价格；其次增加处罚系数,与奖励系数一起对代建单位进行激励,建立费用控制模型,计算得出处罚系数与奖励系数之间的函数关系；最后通过算例的验证说明改进后的费用控制模型相对于传统的只按节约提成的激励模型而言,激励效果更加明显,收益也有很大提高。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托-代理理论 代建制 费用控制模型 改进研究 |
| 收稿时间： | 2010-01-25 |
Improvement Study on the Cost Control Model of Agent Construction of Governmental Investment Project |
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| LIN Guang-li and YIN Yi-lin. Improvement Study on the Cost Control Model of Agent Construction of Governmental Investment Project[J]. Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition), 2010, 12(4): 53-56 |
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| Authors: | LIN Guang-li and YIN Yi-lin |
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| Affiliation: | 1.School of Management, Tianjin University,Tianjin 3000722.School of Management, Tianjin University of Technology,Tianjin 300384 |
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| Abstract: | To compensate the inadequacies of traditional cost control model of the agent construction based on the principal-agent theory,this study improves the model starting from two perspectives: contract price quantification and punishment coefficient.Firstly,both sides give their own prices,based on which,setting up to adjust and calculate,the contract price is determined;secondly,the punishment coefficient is increased to prompt the agent construction together with the reward coefficient,and then the cost contr... |
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| Keywords: | principal-agent theory agent construction cost control model improvement study |
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