| Abstract: | Summary This paper considers the validity of evidence-based practicein social work. It critically examines various underlying presuppositionsand assumptions entailed in evidence-based practice and drawsout their implications for social work. The paper is dividedinto three main parts. Following a consideration of the backgroundto the development of evidence-based practice and a discussionof its key organizing concepts, the paper goes on to examineits underlying scientific assumptions. It shows that evidence-basedpractice proposes a particular deterministic version of rationalitywhich is unsatisfactory. Evidence-based practice is derivedfrom ideas based on optimal behavior in a planned and systematicallyorganized environment. By concentrating on 'epistemic processes'involved in planning and psychological inference it is claimedthat cognitive heuristic devices are the determinants of decisionmaking and not evidence. The heuristic model suggests that decisionmaking is indeterminate, reflexive, locally optimal at bestand based on a limited rationality. It is argued that socialworkers engage in a reflexive understanding and not a determinateor certainty based decision-making process based on objectiveevidence. Complex phenomena such as decision making are notrationally determined or subject to 'control'. The paper goeson to suggest that the tendency to separate processes into 'facts'and 'values' implicit in evidence-based procedures underminesprofessional judgement and discretion in social work. The thirdpart of the paper focuses on the connection between method andideology in evidence-based practice. It examines how the evidence-basedpreoccupation with positivistic methods and determinate judgemententraps social workers within a mechanistic for of technicalrationality. This framework restricts social work to a narrowends-means rationality such that only certain forms of actionare considered legitimate. This feeds into the rhetoric of newmanagerialist strategies aimed at developing a performance cultureby further regulating and controlling individual practitioners.In the conclusion a number of critical indicators are givenwhich should be addressed by the proponents of evidence-basedpractice. It is suggested that unless these are adequately dealtwith, social work is not greatly advanced by adherence to anevidence-based approach. Moreover, the problematic epistemologicaland ideological base associated with it are to be regarded asinherently insuperable. |
