价格随机和销售成本信息不对称下的应急数量弹性契约

以市场需求和市场价格同时波动的二级供应链为研究对象，运用显示机理构建了销售成本信息不对称下的应急数量弹性契约模型，得出最优订货和定价策略，并与对称信息下的决策情况进行对比，分析突发事件及销售成本信息不对称对于供应链最优决策的影响，并用算例进行验证。研究结果表明:当突发事件暴发时，数量弹性契约无法实现价格随机和不对称信息下供应链的协调，供应商仅能通过重置契约保证零售商分享私有信息；此时，供应商期望收益随信息不对称程度增大而减小，零售商却能通过信息不对称获取更丰厚的收益。若市场需求增大，零售商隐藏信息的行为会抑制增产计划，进而降低供应链整体效益；若市场需求减小，供应商采取降低供应量和批发价的策略，可以有效防止供应过量风险。

Emergency Quantity Flexibility Contract with Stochastic Price under Asymmetric Sales Cost Information

Focusing on the two-stage supply chain,in which demand and market price fluctuate randomly,an emergency quantity flexibility contract model under asymmetric information of sale cost was designed using Revelation Principle,in order to find out the optimal ordering and the wholesale price strategy. Meanwhile,the model above was compared with the model under symmetric information to explore the impacts of emergency and the asymmetric information of sale cost on optimal decision of supply chain. Then a numerical example was given to verify the results. The results show that,when emergency causes demand and market price to fluctuate randomly,the supplier can only ensure that retailers share private information by redesigning the contract,but cannot achieve the coordination of supply chain. At this time,the expected revenue of supplier decreases with the increase of information asymmetry. But retailers can obtain more lucrative profits through information asymmetry. If market demand increases,the retailer''s behavior of hiding information will inhibit the production increasing plan, and reduce the supply chain profit. Meanwhile,if market demand decreases,the supplier''s strategy of reducing supply and wholesale price can effectively prevent oversupply risk.