行政发包制在大气环境治理中的作用——基于随机演化博弈模型

中国大气环境治理有比较浓厚的行政发包色彩。构建随机演化博弈模型，研究强激励、目标考核、问责制3个要素在大气环境行政发包管理中的作用、效果与层级适用性问题。通过设定总收益函数计算3类要素带来的动态收益，模拟3类要素单独或联合作用下的策略稳定性、平均治污概率。研究结果表明:（1）强激励措施容易引起策略发散，环境目标考核策略稳定性较好，问责制的稳定性最好；（2）单独使用问责制容易导致较低的减排效果，但其和其他两类要素配合使用时，既可以起策略稳定的作用，又可以提升减排效果；（3）高层级发包应采用环境目标考核联合问责制，基层发包宜采取强激励措施联合问责制进行管理。

Administrative Subcontract in Chinese Atmospheric Environmental Governance-A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis

Administrative subcontract is broadly used in atmospheric environmental governance in China. This paper attempts to demonstrate the effects and limitations of three factors in administrative subcontract, including strong motivation, result orientation and accountability mechanism, by establishing a stochastic evolutionary game model. Strategy stability and pollution treatment probabilities are discussed by constructing dynamic payoff functions of the three factors. The main conclusions are:(1)Strategies will become divergent under a strong motivation mechanism, the result orientation mechanism has greater stability, and the accountability mechanism the greatest stability;(2)the accountability mechanism itself will lead to low pollution treatment level, but when it is combined with the other two factors, it can not only help stabilize strategies but also help promote pollution treatment;(3)Combining the result orientation mechanism with the accountability mechanism is fit for high level governmental administrative subcontract, while combining the strong motivation mechanism with the accountability mechanism is fit for basic level atmospheric environmental governance.