首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

农村信用社改革中道德风险分析与规避
引用本文:张颖慧. 农村信用社改革中道德风险分析与规避[J]. 中国农业大学学报(社会科学版), 2006, 23(2): 38-42
作者姓名:张颖慧
作者单位:西北农林科技大学,经济管理学院,陕西,杨凌,712100
基金项目:陕西省农村信用社联合社横向委托课题“陕西省农村信用社一级法人社组建及管理模式研究”资助
摘    要:文章对农村信用社改革的总体思路进行了全面回顾,提出中央、地方和农村信用社之间的不完全合同以及由此产生的道德风险问题是影响当前农村金融制度运行低效率的重要因素,农村信用社道德风险发生机制比较复杂,表现更具隐蔽性,对制度的设计和执行具有更高的要求,规避农村信用社改革中道德风险应当成为提高制度运行效率的重要议题。

关 键 词:农村信用社  道德风险  不完全合同  规避
文章编号:1009-508(2006)02-0038-05
修稿时间:2006-01-14

Moral Hazards Analysis and Evasion in the Reformof Rural Credit Cooperatives
Zhang Yinghui. Moral Hazards Analysis and Evasion in the Reformof Rural Credit Cooperatives[J]. Journal of China Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition), 2006, 23(2): 38-42
Authors:Zhang Yinghui
Abstract:This paper reviews the major ideas and institutional consequences of Rural Credit Cooperative reform in recent years.The major reason causing rural financial performance inefficiency is the incomplete contract between the central government,the local government and the rural credit cooperatives,as well as the subsequent moral hazards resulting from the incomplete contract.The mechanism fermenting such moral hazards among rural credit cooperative is more complicated and hidden,which calls for higher requirements in the design and implementation of systems.Evading moral hazards in rural credit cooperatives has been an important topic in improving their efficiency.
Keywords:Rural credit cooperatives  Moral hazards  Evasion  Incomplete contract
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《中国农业大学学报(社会科学版)》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《中国农业大学学报(社会科学版)》下载全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号