| Abstract: | To aid in their safety oversight of large‐scale, potentially dangerous energy and water infrastructure and transportation systems, public utility regulatory agencies increasingly seek to use formal risk assessment models. Yet some of the approaches to risk assessment used by utilities and their regulators may be less useful for this purpose than is supposed. These approaches often do not reflect the current state of the art in risk assessment strategy and methodology. This essay explores why utilities and regulatory agencies might embrace risk assessment techniques that do not sufficiently assess organizational and managerial factors as drivers of risk, nor that adequately represent important uncertainties surrounding risk calculations. Further, it describes why, in the special legal, political, and administrative world of the typical public utility regulator, strategies to identify and mitigate formally specified risks might actually diverge from the regulatory promotion of “safety.” Some improvements are suggested that can be made in risk assessment approaches to support more fully the safety oversight objectives of public regulatory agencies, with examples from “high‐reliability organizations” (HROs) that have successfully merged the management of safety with the management of risk. Finally, given the limitations of their current risk assessments and the lessons from HROs, four specific assurances are suggested that regulatory agencies should seek for themselves and the public as objectives in their safety oversight of public utilities. |
