控制权和现金流量权偏离下的公司价值和公司治理

本研究运用La Porta et al追踪公司"最终控制权"的方法,通过分析终极控制股东的控制权与现金流量权偏离对公司价值的影响程度,来衡量控制股东对于小股东财富剥夺的程度.实证研究发现我国上市公司的终极控制股东普遍运用投资公司控股、金字塔结构的方式获取控制权,并因此而使其控制权与现金流量权产生偏离,且偏离幅度越大,上市公司的市场价值就越小,终极控制股东对小股东剥削的程度就越大,其中又以终极控制股东为家族企业的上市公司最为严重.

Control Rights Deviate from Cash Flow Rights、Corporate Value and Corporate Governance

The study adopts the method developed by La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer(1999),which traces the chain of ownership to find who is the controlling shareholders of firm,analyze the influence to the value of corporation because of controlling shareholders' control rights deviating from cash flow rights,then examine the evidence on expropriation of minority shareholders.The empirical study find that the controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights because they through the use of pyramids,investing company and participation in management.The more the controlling shareholders' control rights deviate from cash flow rights,the worse value of publicly listed companies,and the worsen the central agency problem is between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.And the condition of family control company is the worst.