| 业绩的隐性激励与经理报酬契约的改进 |
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| 引用本文： | 张勇,张强.业绩的隐性激励与经理报酬契约的改进[J].管理工程学报,2005,19(4):132-134. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张勇 张强 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川,成都,610031;西南科技大学管理学院,四川,绵阳,621002
2. 西南科技大学管理学院,四川,绵阳,621002 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文认为经营业绩对经理有隐性激励作用是完全有可能的,将业绩的隐性激励作用引入经理的效用函数后建立了对经理的最优报酬激励模型,并通过对模型进行求解得到改进的最优报酬契约。通过分析给出了主要结论。
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| 关 键 词： | 信息不对称 报酬契约 代理理论 激励 |
| 文章编号： | 1004-6062(2005)04-0132-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年11月11 |
Implicit Incentives of Accomplishment and Improve Reward Contract of Manager |
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| ZHANG Yong,ZHANG Qiang.Implicit Incentives of Accomplishment and Improve Reward Contract of Manager[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2005,19(4):132-134. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Yong ZHANG Qiang |
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| Institution: | ZHANG Yong~ |
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| Abstract: | In this paper,we study implicit incentive of accomplishment that a manager achieves in the company.In this conditions;we study a manager's optimal contract.Firstly,we think completely possible that accomplishment have implicit incentive to the manager.Then we improve the optimal contract derive from implicit incentives of accomplishment and we establish a model of optimal reward incentive.We get type of optimal reward through solve the model.Again,we use tool of limplicit incentive coefficient and analyze its effect to optimal contract. |
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| Keywords: | asymmetric information reward contract theory of principal incentive |
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