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论休谟认识论的人性前提
引用本文:唐桂丽.论休谟认识论的人性前提[J].武汉大学学报(人文科学版),2005,58(1):22-26.
作者姓名:唐桂丽
作者单位:江汉大学,政法学院,湖北,武汉,430040
摘    要:休谟通过否认上帝、纯粹理性和物质实体的独立性,否认普遍必然性的存在,完成了他对以往认识论形而上学基础的剥离;又通过将人视为知觉集合体和行为集合体,将认识的重心放在由印象和本能行为构成的日常生活世界;从这个意义上来说,他的经验基础也就是他的人性前提。因而,把握休谟认识论的人性前提,是理解休谟认识论特征的关键。

关 键 词:休谟  反形而上学性  人性  经验
文章编号:1671-881X(2005)01-0022-05
修稿时间:2004年9月12日

On Humanistic Premise of Hume's Epistemology
TANG Gui-li.On Humanistic Premise of Hume''''s Epistemology[J].Wuhan University Journal (Humanity Sciences),2005,58(1):22-26.
Authors:TANG Gui-li
Abstract:Hume finished his departure from his Epistemology's Metaphysics basis by denying God, pure reason and substance's independence. He regards human as an aggregation of consciousness and action, ands put the focus of Epistemology on the practical world consisted of impression and instinct action. Judging from this aspect, Hume's experience basis is his humanistic premise. To draw a conclusion, the understanding of the humanistic premise of Hume's Epistemology is the key to the understanding of the feature of Hume's Epistemology.
Keywords:Hume  anti-metaphysics  human  experience  
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