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国家与产权:一个悖论?
引用本文:陈国富. 国家与产权:一个悖论?[J]. 南开学报(哲学社会科学版), 2004, 1(6): 76-84
作者姓名:陈国富
作者单位:南开大学经济学系 天津300071
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学研究项目(01JB790002)
摘    要:国家与产权的关系决定着一国的长期经济绩效。国家介入产权内生于产权排他性对强制性力量的需求,起初,维护产权排他性的力量是通过各种社会机制提供的,但产权的演进最终将这种力量安排由国家来提供。但是,国家成为强制力量的合法垄断者以后,它可能维护产权,推进经济发展;也可能侵害产权,引起经济衰退。因此,对国家进行有效约束是保证经济持续增长的一个基本条件。但产权对国家的有效约束依赖于社会结构的转型。

关 键 词:产权  排他性  国家  契约
文章编号:1001-4667(2004)06-0076-09
修稿时间:2004-04-20

State and Property:Contradiction?
Chen Guofu. State and Property:Contradiction?[J]. Nankai Journal, 2004, 1(6): 76-84
Authors:Chen Guofu
Abstract:The relationship between State and property can determine the long economic performance of a country. The root of government getting involved in property right is the exclusiveness and compulsory nature of property. Initially, it defended itself through every possible social institution; but at last with the evolution of properties, the state became the legal defender. Anyway, although the government protects property from violation and promotes economic development, it misappropriates properties and might cause economic stagnation. Therefore, to restrict government activities in this area may be imortant to guarantee continuous economic growth. The effective restriction through property will depend upon social structural transition.
Keywords:Property  Exclusiveness  State  Contract  
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