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基于多产品企业定价的激励机制设计分析
引用本文:高萍.基于多产品企业定价的激励机制设计分析[J].西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学版),2008,18(3):35-41.
作者姓名:高萍
作者单位:西北大学,经济管理学院,陕西,西安,710069
摘    要:基于一些基本假设提出了一种激励性定价机制,在该机制下,被规制企业可以在约束Rj下满足消费者的需求的同时来开发自己的潜能降低成本。为了进一步减少规制机构进行规制时所需要的信息,在原先的规制机制中插入了第二个回合的检验,同时我们还对规制机制进行了两点延伸,说明了在长期策略和平均成本递增这两种情况下,该机制仍然适用。

关 键 词:消费者剩余  预算约束  福利最大化
文章编号:1008-472X(2008)03-0035-07
修稿时间:2008年3月10日

Scheming Analysis of Incentive Mechanism Based on Multiproduct Pricing
GAO PING.Scheming Analysis of Incentive Mechanism Based on Multiproduct Pricing[J].Journal of Xidian University (Social Sciences Edition),2008,18(3):35-41.
Authors:GAO PING
Institution:GAO PING (School of Economics and Management, Northwest University, Xi'an, 710069, China)
Abstract:Based on some basic hypothesis, the paper puts forward an incentive pricing mechanism, unaer the mechanism, the regulated firm constrained by R1 is encouraged to exploit both the potential for cost decreases and the consumers' willingness to pay. In order to limit the information requirements of the agency to bookkeeping data, a second loop is inserted into the mechanism. Also two extensions are given for the mechanism, showing that under the long-run strategy and non-decreasing ray average costs, the mechanism is also effective.
Keywords:Consumers' surplus  Budget constraint  Maximization of welfare
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