EVA对股东和经理人博弈的影响

在委托代理关系下,股东和经理人之间的博弈行为会受到激励合同中业绩评价指标的影响。作为一个价值衡量指标,EVA可以被引入激励合同,作为经理人考核的标准。围绕“股东价值最大化”的根本目标,EVA激励体系将在目标类型选择等五个方面对股东和经理人的博弈行为产生影响。EVA对博弈的影响是积极和有效的,激励合同对EVA的引入将有助于委托代理成本的减少。EVA在中国企业的实践应避免教条主义。

EVA's Effects upon the Game between Shareholders and Managers

The game between shareholders and managers will be affected by performance metrics in the incentive contract under the relationship of principal-agent. EVA can be used in the contract as a value evaluation metric and play a role to be a manager-examining standard. Around the top objective of "shareholder value maximization", EVA incentive system has effects upon the game from 5 perspectives. The effects is positive and can reduce the agency cost. Avoiding dogmatism is important for the practice of EVA in Chinese corporations.