碳税制度下企业产品升级及信息披露策略研究

在实行碳税制度的背景下,本文构建了包含两家制造商的双寡头模型,以其中一家制造商是否投资产品升级减排作为关键信息,分别研究信息不公开(模型1)和信息公开(模型2)时两家制造商的均衡定价与最优利润以及制造商产品升级的条件,并且进一步研究当制造商同时掌握技术决策权和信息披露权时选择四种不同决策方案的条件。理论结果表明,如果升级后单位实际生产成本变大,制造商选择不升级且不公开;如果升级后单位实际成本变小,当升级后利润增值大于固定成本投入时,制造商选择升级并不公开,反之,选择不升级并公开。无论升级前后单位实际成本大小关系如何,制造商都不会选择升级且公开信息。数值试验部分表明,当制造商同时掌握技术选择权和信息披露权时,碳税是驱动制造商进行升级减排的主要因素,随着碳税的提高,制造商会依次从不升级不公开,不升级公开到升级不公开做决策。当不升级的概率越大时,制造商会在较低的碳税点越早开始升级;当减排努力越大时,制造商会在较高的碳税点才开始升级。

Product upgrading and information disclosure decisions in the context of carbon tax

Environmental issues have received increasing attention in recent years.Governments in many regions have taken steps to encourage manufacturers to reduce their emissions to protect the environment.Carbon taxes are one common measure designed to reduce carbon emissions in the manufacturing process.A carbon tax,if implemented,would inflate manufacturers’unit production costs,based on the level of emissions generated by the production process–and,consequently,motivate manufacturers to consider upgrading the technology in their facilities to reduce emissions.In a competitive environment,information on manufacturers'technology upgrades has an important impact on competitors'production decisions.This paper focuses on the technology upgrade and information disclosure strategies used among competing manufacturers,in the context of carbon tax,and on the construction of a duopoly model with two manufacturers(M1 and M2)competing simultaneously through game theory.It assumes:M1 does not apply product upgrades and emission reduction technologies,and M2 applies product upgrade and emission reduction technologies.We study the optimal decision-making and profit performance of manufacturers in three different situations.These three situations are M2:only technology choice,only information disclosure,and both technology decision-making and information disclosure.First,the paper separately studies the optimal decision-making and equilibrium performance of the two manufacturers in the case of information asymmetry(model 1)and information disclosure(model 2)when there is a technology choice for M2.In Model 1,product upgrade decision information will not be published for M2,and pricing decisions will be made for M1 based on probabilistic estimate of the upgrade for M2.The results show that when the actual unit cost(sum of unit production cost and unit carbon tax cost)of the upgrade becomes larger,the technology upgrade for M2 will not be carried out;when the actual unit cost of the upgrade becomes smaller,the investment cost will be fixed according to the technology upgrade.M2 will decide whether to upgrade technology based on the fixed investment cost and the size of the profit from the technology upgrade.In Model 2,the upgrade information for M2 is disclosed.Since Model 2 is actually a special case when Model 1 has an upgrade probability of 0 or 1,the result in Model 2 is similar to that of Model 1.Next,the paper discusses the optimal disclosure decisions for M2 under different conditions when determining technical decisions(upgrade or not).The results show that when the actual cost of the upgraded unit becomes small,if the upgrade of M2 is made,disclosing this information is not more favorable to both parties;if the upgrade is not made for M2,disclosing the information is more favorable to both parties.When the actual cost of the upgraded unit becomes larger,if the upgrade is made for M2,information disclosure is more favorable for both parties;if the upgrade of M2 is not made,the non-disclosure of information is beneficial to both parties.In short,information asymmetry is not always beneficial to M2,it depends mainly on the given technology choices of M2 and the cost relationship before and after the upgrade.Finally,the paper discusses conditions for M2 selecting among four decision-making schemes when there are both technological upgrade options and information disclosure rights.The four schemes are:upgrade and disclose,upgrade but do not disclose,do not upgrade and disclose the decision,do not upgrade nor disclose.The results show that if the actual total unit cost of production is likely to increase following the technology upgrade,the best option for M2 is to not upgrade nor disclose;on the contrary,if the actual total unit cost of production is likely to decrease following the technology upgrade,the best option for M2 is to upgrade but not disclose if the ensuing profit increase is also likely to be greater than the fixed cost input,and vice versa;regardless of the cost-benefit relationship before or after the upgrade,manufacturer M2 will choose not to upgrade and disclose that information.Compared with the M2 case where the technology upgrade is not regulated and the cost information of both parties is disclosed,profit of M2 can be maximized by selecting the optimal strategy.In the case where a good balance is achieved between technology upgrades and information disclosure,the optimal profit of M1 may be minimized,indicating that achieving such a balance plays an important role in a competitive environment.The numerical test section shows that carbon tax is a critical factor driving the transition of M2 to better emission reduction technologies.As the carbon tax increases,M2 would change from not being upgraded nor the decision disclosed,to not being upgraded and the decision disclosed,and finally to being upgraded but the decision not disclosed.When the likelihood of upgrading the technology for M1 is lower,M2 will begin to upgrade at a lower carbon tax point;when the likelihood of emission reduction efforts is greater,M2 will begin to upgrade at a higher carbon tax point.This paper provides some management advice to governments and manufacturers through theoretical and numerical reasoning.