政府在企业兼并与技术转让中的的策略选择

在Stackelberg竞争条件下,提高产品质量的技术转让与企业兼并之间存有如下关系与技术转让相比,技术拥有企业总是偏好企业兼并,但是企业兼并会降低社会福利;就技术转让的形式而言,技术拥有企业绝不会选择固定收费方式,可是,因为特许权收费(或双重收费)方式既不能提高技术拥有企业的收益,也不能提高技术接受企业的收益,所以技术授权可能不会发生.但是,因为技术授权可以提高社会福利,所以政府应禁止企业兼并,并且干预企业的技术授权行为.

The Government Strategies on Firm's in Merging and Licensing

In this paper we develop a model where a higher- quality product firm competes with a lower-quality product firm in Stackelberg fashion. We compare licensing with merger. We find that although merger is better for the patent holder, it is welfare - reducing. Since fixed - fee licensing makes the patentee worse off, thus the patent holder never chooses such a licensing contract. Under royalty contact, it is possible that licensing does not occur. To improve social welfare, the government should force the patent holding firm to license its technology.