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基于博弈分析的农村信用社产权改革路径选择
引用本文:宋 磊,王家传. 基于博弈分析的农村信用社产权改革路径选择[J]. 中国农业大学学报(社会科学版), 2005, 22(4): 39-43
作者姓名:宋 磊  王家传
作者单位:山东农业大学,经济管理学院,山东,泰安,271018
基金项目:山东省社会科学规划“农村经济研究”基金项目(2005-2007)(项目批准号:04AJJ10)——《山东省农村信用社产权制度试点改革研究》课题研究阶段成果
摘    要:随着我国农村信用社改革的步步深化,新型产权组织模式与运行机制的构建已经走到了攻坚阶段。文章在归纳分析农村信用社改革与发展背景及基本现状的基础上,围绕政府与农村信用社双方的益损值,对政府推行农村信用社合作制规范进行了博弈分析,由最终的纳什均衡分析结果,得出了在现有农村信用社基础上搞统一的合作制规范不切实际,农村信用社改革必须走“多元化”产权组织模式道路的结论,并就新时期如何进一步发展与完善农村信用社“多元化”产权组织模式提出了几点政策性建议。

关 键 词:农村信用社  博弈分析  产权  行为选择
文章编号:1009-508X(2005)04-0039-05
修稿时间:2005-09-06

Path Selection of Rural Credit Co-Operatives in TheirOwnership Reform, a Game Theory Perspective
Song Lei,Wang Jiachuan. Path Selection of Rural Credit Co-Operatives in TheirOwnership Reform, a Game Theory Perspective[J]. Journal of China Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition), 2005, 22(4): 39-43
Authors:Song Lei  Wang Jiachuan
Abstract:With the deepening of rural credit co-operatives,restructuring of ownership and operation mechanism have reached the critical stage.By analyzing the development and current situation of rural credit co-operatives,the article makes a game theory analysis of the local governments and their role in standardizing the operations of rural credit co-operatives.The results of Nash equilibrium show that it is impractical to have a uniform standard for rural co-operatives.Rural co-operatives have to follow multiple patterns in their development.Policy design proposals are also made on how to further develop rural credit co-operatives under the pluralized ownership concept.
Keywords:Rural credit co-operatives  Game theory analysis  Ownership right  Behavior selection
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