| 防范串谋行为的独立董事最优激励机制模型研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘惠萍,张世英.防范串谋行为的独立董事最优激励机制模型研究[J].西北农林科技大学学报,2005,5(5):82-85. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘惠萍 张世英 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072;山东经济学院,济南,250014
2. 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助课题(70272044)，博士点基金资助项目(20030056014) |
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| 摘 要： | 目前我国独立董事制度的运行实践中存在独立董事职能弱化及串谋问题,应建立中小股东-独立董事-经营者结构下的防范串谋激励机制模型,得出最优防范串谋契约;在此基础上,建议对独立董事采取区别其所披露信息给予不同的激励工资,而且对他们的约束机制也是不可缺少的,特别是应加大对其违规行为的惩罚力度。
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| 关 键 词： | 管理工程 最优防范串谋契约 契约理论 独立董事 贿赂 约束机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-9107(2005)05-0082-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年12月24 |
Research on Model of Collusion-proofness Incentive Mechanism for Independent Directors |
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| LIU Hui-ping.Research on Model of Collusion-proofness Incentive Mechanism for Independent Directors[J].Journal of Northwest Sci-Tech University of Agriculture and Forestry(Social Science),2005,5(5):82-85. |
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| Authors: | LIU Hui-ping~ |
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| Institution: | LIU Hui-ping~ |
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| Abstract: | In view of the tendency that independent directors have weak function and collusion problem exists in the operation of independent directors system in China,a model of collusion-proofness incentive mechanism under the middle and small shareholders-independent director-manager structure is established and optimal contract is acquired. Based on this model, suggestions are expounded that a discriminatory reward to independent directors should be offered according to information they revealed and commitment mechanism be indispensable,in particular a high punishment to their dereliction of duty. |
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| Keywords: | managerial engineering the optimal collusion-proofness contract contract theory independent directors bribe commitment mechanism |
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