中国国有企业的国际议价能力估算

 通过建立讨价还价理论模型，本文证明了谈判过程中让步成本较小的一方获得的收益较少。由于存在预算软约束和相对严重的委托代理问题，国有企业的让步并不会给代理人造成相应损失，相应地国有企业议价能力较低。运用2006年海关进出口交易数据，使用双边随机前沿分析方法（Two-tier SFA）测度谈判底线，本文估算了中国国有企业的国际议价能力。结果显示：（1）国有企业的讨价还价能力低于民营企业和外资企业；（2）国有企业的讨价还价能力也低于进出口交易伙伴，其进口价格高于公允价格3.69%，出口价格低于公允价格6.17%。因而继续推进市场化改革，中国才能在国际市场上获取公平的贸易收益。

The Estimation of International Bargaining Power of Chinese State-owned Enterprises

By establishing a bargaining model, we proved that less concession costs will lead to less bargaining gains. Due to soft budget constraint and relative seriousness of the principal-agent problem, the state-owned enterprises make concessions without consequential costs, therefore bargaining power lowered. Using Custom data of year 2006 and two-tier SFA method, we estimated international bargaining power of China’s state-owned enterprises. The result showed that: (1) the bargaining power of SOEs are lower than private and foreign-funded enterprises; (2) bargaining power of SOEs are also lower than the import or export trading partners: import price is higher about 3.69% and export price is lower about 6.17% than the fair price. Therefore, China should continue promoting market oriented reforms to obtain fair trade gains in global market.