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简析维特根斯坦关于可能性的理解
引用本文:韩林合. 简析维特根斯坦关于可能性的理解[J]. 云南大学学报(社会科学版), 2006, 5(6): 28-37
作者姓名:韩林合
作者单位:北京大学,北京,100871
摘    要:前后期维特根斯坦对可能性(即可能情形)给出了两种截然不同的分析。前期给特根斯坦认为,可能性是一种独立于语言表现的、虽然没有实现出来但却(现实地)存在的事态。因而,可能性可以说是一种“影子式的实在(现实)”。后期维特根斯坦则认为,可能性并非是一种独立于语方表现的存在物,“某某事项是可能的”这种说法只是意味着“关于某某事项的语言表现合乎相关的语法规则”而已。

关 键 词:可能性  对象  存在  物理可能  逻辑可能  规则
文章编号:1671-7511(2006)06-0028-10
修稿时间:2006-03-17

A Brief Analysis of Wittgenstein's Interpretation of Possibility
HAN Lin-he. A Brief Analysis of Wittgenstein's Interpretation of Possibility[J]. Journal of Yunnan Yniversity, 2006, 5(6): 28-37
Authors:HAN Lin-he
Abstract:Ludwig Wittgenstein gives two completely different interpretations of "possibility" in his early life and in his later life. Wittgenstein in his early life holds that possibility is a state in (actual) existence which has not been achieved and is separate from linguistic expression while actuality is a state in (actual) existence which has been achieved and is separate from linguistic expression. Thus, possibility can be regarded as "shadow-like actuality". In his later life, Wittgenstein holds that possibility is not a being independent of linguistic expression and "something is possible" only means that "the linguistic expression of something suits the corresponding grammatical rules".
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