An economic analysis of public sector collective bargaining and strike activity |
| |
Authors: | William B Nelson Gerald W Stone J Michael Swint |
| |
Institution: | (1) Indiana University, Northwest;(2) Metropolitan State College—Denver and The University of Colorado at Denver, USA;(3) University of Texas School of Public Health, USA |
| |
Abstract: | This paper develops a theory of public sector collective bargaining and uses it to investigate the economic determinants of
public sector strike activity. The model considers union leaders, union members, bureaucrats, politicians, and voters, with
the intention of explicitly recognizing both the constraints placed on the bargaining parties by their constituents and the
differences between public and private sector collective bargaining. The empirical results indicate that only in cases where
both negotiating parties are motivated by self-interest can we expect frequent strikes and strikes of long duration. The results
also suggest that public sector strikes are countercyclical and principally influenced by the business cycle and its impact
on state and local revenues. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|