Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games |
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Authors: | Michael Finus Bianca Rundshagen |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, Scotland, UK;(2) Department of Economics, University of Hagen, Profilstr. 8, 58084 Hagen, Germany |
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Abstract: | This paper compares the stability of coalition structures under six institutional settings of treaty formation in positive
externality games. We argue that many economic problems belong to the class of positive externality games (i.e. outsiders
benefit from the formation of coalitions) and hence our results can be applied to many situations. It is shown that it is
easier to sustain agreements under exclusive than under open membership and the higher the “degree of consensus” necessary
to form a coalition. |
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Keywords: | |
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