不对称双寡头企业技术创新投资决策研究

许多研究技术创新投资决策的期权博弈文献忽视了企业之间的投资成本和经营成本的不对称性,本文研究成本不对称双寡头企业技术创新投资决策问题。首先,导出企业投资收益函数和投资临界值。接着对存在的三种均衡,即抢占均衡、序列均衡和同时投资均衡进行了分析讨论,结果表明,成本不对称程度较小和先动优势不大情况下,企业将同时投资;当先动优势较大的情况下,低成本企业将先投资成为领先者;当企业成本不对称程度很大时,企业将序列执行投资期权。最后,结合案例进行数值计算,验证了理论分析结果。

Study on Investment in Technology Innovation of Asymmetric Duopoly

Most of option game literatures on investment decision in technology innovation ignore asymmetric investment cost and operation cost among firms. Investment decision making in technology innovation of asymmetric cost duopoly is studied in this paper.Firstly,value function and investment threshold are derived.Then three equilibriums such as preemptive,sequential and simultaneous equilibrium are discussed,and the results indicate that when the asymmetry among firms is relatively small and so is the first-mover advantage,the firms invest jointly;when the first-mover advantage is significant,the lower-cost firm preempts the higher-cost firm to be a leader;in the situation where the asymmetry among firms becomes sufficiently large,the firms exercise their investment options sequentially.Finally,numerical techniques are employed to calculate the optimal investment thresholds of duopoly and the findings are consistent with the theoretic results.