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具有网络外部性的双寡头市场的动态定价策略
引用本文:刘晓峰,黄沛,杨雄峰.具有网络外部性的双寡头市场的动态定价策略[J].中国管理科学,2007,15(1):94-98.
作者姓名:刘晓峰  黄沛  杨雄峰
作者单位:上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院, 上海200052
摘    要:本文通过将消费者对网络大小的预期引入消费者的效用函数,刻画了消费者预期如何影响市场潜量。然后,通过微分对策,分析了在垄断竞争的市场结构中的厂商如何在考虑到消费者对今后的预期时,如何动态的决定自己的价格和相应的策略。结果表明,随着消费者对网络增长预期的增大,将导致更大的网络规模和更低的初始价格。寡头的利润受消费者对其产量的预期的影响。

关 键 词:动态定价  垄断竞争  网络外部性  微分对策  开环纳什均衡  
文章编号:1003-207(2007)01-0094-05
收稿时间:2005-11-28
修稿时间:2005年11月28

Optimal Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Network Externalities of the Duopolistic Marketing
LIU Xiao-feng,HUANG Pei,YANG Xiong-feng.Optimal Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Network Externalities of the Duopolistic Marketing[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2007,15(1):94-98.
Authors:LIU Xiao-feng  HUANG Pei  YANG Xiong-feng
Institution:Aetna School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiaofong University, Shanghai 200052, China
Abstract:This paper analyzes the dynamic pricing decision of a duopolistic marketing,a new product or service whose consumption value increases with the expansion of the "network" of adopters. We characterize an optimal pricing strategy,which maximizes the present value of the duopolistic profits,subject to the dynamics of the demand for network access. The dynamics depends,among other factors,on the current price and consumer anticipations about future network growth. We examine the effects of changes in the growth anticipations and the discount rate on the optimal equilibrium access price and network size. It is shown that higher growth anticipations and a lower discount rate result in a lower equilibrium price and a larger network,which is similar to the monopolist marketing.
Keywords:dynamic pricing  duopolistic marketing  network externalities  differential game  open-loop Nash equilibrium  
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