| 基于博弈论的横向并购分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 胡金庚.基于博弈论的横向并购分析[J].电子科技大学学报(社会科学版),2006,8(5):25-28. |
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| 作者姓名： | 胡金庚 |
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| 作者单位： | 电子科技大学,成都,610054 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文以博弈论为分析工具,通过两个市场竞争模型,分析了当横向并购产生一个行业领导者时企业并购的动机和社会福利变化情况。结果表明:当横向并购能产生一个行业领导者时,寡头企业普遍存在并购动机,且在一定条件下社会福利增加。
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| 关 键 词： | 横向并购 博弈论 动机 社会福利 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-8105(2006)05-0025-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年12月30 |
Analysis of Horizontal Mergers Based on Game Theory |
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| HU Jin-geng.Analysis of Horizontal Mergers Based on Game Theory[J].Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition),2006,8(5):25-28. |
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| Authors: | HU Jin-geng |
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| Institution: | Univ.of Elec.Sci.& Tech.of China Chengdu 610054 China |
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| Abstract: | Base on two models,this paper analyses the motive and the change of social welfare after merges in the case of appearing a leader.The result shows that:when merges can make a leader,firms generally have motives to merge and social welfare increase in definite condition after mergers. |
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| Keywords: | horizontal mergers game theory motive social welfare |
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