双边道德风险条件下供应链的质量控制策略

运用委托代理理论方法探讨了双边道德风险条件下供应链的质量控制策略.在供应商的质量预防投入成本和销售商的质量评价投入成本均为不可观测的信息的情况下,供应商和销售商都可能会发生签约后的道德风险问题.为了减少由此产生的双边道德风险,将供应商提供不合格产品而销售商未能检测出时对供应商的惩罚,及销售商检测出供应商的产品有缺陷时对其施以的惩罚作为激励措施.在考虑了双方的收益目标后,建立了双边道德风险条件下的质量控制模型.运用进化规划算法对模型作了仿真计算.

Strategy of quality control in supply chain under double moral hazard condition

On the basis of principal_agent theory, strategy of quality control in supply chain under double moral hazard condition is discussed. When the supplier's costs which are invested in products' quality prevention and seller's costs which are invested in products' quality appraisal both are unobservable information,the supplier and seller may incur moral hazard after contracting. In order to reduce the double moral hazard, the incentive measurements are given: one is the penalty to supplier when supplier provi...