信任、忠诚与家族主义困境

马克斯·韦伯在《儒教与道教》中指出：“……经济伦理往往是十分复杂的东西 ,受到多方面的限制;另外 ,我们也会看到 ,表面上相似的经济组织形式与一种极不相同的经济伦理结合起来 ,就会按照各自的特点产生出极不相同的历史作用。经济伦理不是经济组织形式的简单的‘因变量’ ,同样 ,经济伦理也不是反过来从自己一方去塑造经济组织形式。” (中译本 ,１９９９)。我们在这里研究的信任属于经济伦理的范畴 ,长期以来被排斥在规范经济学的研究范围之外。近年来 ,对于东亚经济奇迹的研究表明 ,缺乏经济伦理与文化维度的研究 ,就不能很好地理解…

Trust,Loyalty and the Predicament that Clannishness is In

My basic standpoint expressed in this paper is that, although TRUST has been defined in different aspects, there is no definition of TRUST that is aimed at depicting the cultural system characteristic of China, as opposed to the Western definition. In order to comprehend accurately the TRUST structure under the circumstances of Chinese culture, it is necessary to divide TRUST into social and individual. The social trust is founded on law and legal contracts, while private trust is an evolutionary process based on trust administration and coordinative games among individuals or organizations. Compared with the Western developed market economy, China lacks social trust while she has more private trust of which the market is cut apart, in other words, it is a "difference sequence structure"with discrimination against outsiders and in favor of insiders. In this article, this special trust structure is defined as "TRUST of CLANNISHNESS". Different from the Western general trust based on CONFIDENCE, this trust of clan system is built on LOYALTY. It can be discerned that, if described with Bryan's coordinative games, the clannish trust may result in the optimum Pareto Coordinative game, which can better solve the trust problem in agency. The clannish trust, however, cannot, or can hardly untangle problems of the lack of agent ability --the problems that crop up with the organizational scale or trade complexity increased, which are called CLANNISHNESS DELEMMA in this paper. And under special trade circumstances, the management by trust, as a choice made when the time is opportune, is determined, under the conditions of the specified cultural system, by the managerial cost structure.