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企业恶性增资:委托代理视角及中国的实证
引用本文:刘超.企业恶性增资:委托代理视角及中国的实证[J].河北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2004,29(3):63-65.
作者姓名:刘超
作者单位:南开大学,国际商学院,天津,300071
基金项目:南开大学文科创新基金资助研究课题(NKC04001)
摘    要:恶性增资(Escalation of Commitment)是指企业对一个失败的投资项目继续投入资源的行为。导致企业管理者作出恶性增资决策的原因很多,代理理论为此提供了一个非常有说服力的解释。与以前研究者所遵循的将凌策者个体为研究对象的实验研究方法不同,试图通过比较三资企业与国有企业的投资效率差异来提供对这一解释的实证支持。

关 键 词:恶性增资  代理理论  治理结构
文章编号:1005-6378(2004)03-0063-03
修稿时间:2004年2月23日

Escalation of Commitment:Principal-Agent Perspective and the Empirical Analysis in China
LIUChao.Escalation of Commitment:Principal-Agent Perspective and the Empirical Analysis in China[J].Journal of Hebei University(Philosophy and Social Science),2004,29(3):63-65.
Authors:LIUChao
Abstract:In corporate finance field, Escalation of Commitment means a firm continues to invest additional resources in what appears to be a losing project. There are many reasons to explain why the project managers decide to escalate, but the agency theory provides a convictive theoretical framework. Large numbers of studies show that the agency problem plays an important role when the managers make an escalation decision. Unlike the traditional studies which mainly use the laboratory method, this paper provides an empirical analysis on escalation by comparing the difference of investment efficiency between State-owned enterprises and Foreign-invested ones.
Keywords:escalation  agency theory  governance structure
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