控制权私有收益计量模型的评述与改进

与传统的股东与管理者委托代理关系不同的控股股东与中小股东之间的代理问题(即第二类代理问题)成为近年来公司金融领域的研究热点。控制权私有收益问题的重要研究内容之一就是对其水平高低进行测定。文章在评述大股东控制权私有收益计量模型相关文献的基础上,从中国上市公司股权分置改革对计量模型产生影响的角度,对大宗股权转让溢价模型(BH模型)进行分析与修正,提出测度控制权私有收益的股改前模型和股改后模型。

The Comments and Improvement of Private Benefits of Control' s Econometric Models

Differing from traditional principal-agent relationship between shareholders and managers,the agency issue between controlling shareholders and small shareholders(namely second agency issue) has been a hot topic in corporate finance during recent years.One of the major issues of private benefits of control is to measure its level.Based on the comments about the literature of private benefits of control’s econometric models,from an angle of the influences of China listed companies’ shareholding reform on econometric models,this paper analyzes and improves Barclay and Holderness’ private benefits from control of public corporations(BH Model),and raises the econometric models of before and after shareholding reform for private benefits of control.