Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras |
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Authors: | Kari Saukkonen |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, Turku School of Economics, 20500 Turku, Finland |
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Abstract: | Social choice functions are studied with an infinite population framework that includes algebras over the set of individuals. It is shown that continuous social choice functions are either dictatorial or manipulable. Weak anonymity is shown to be incompatible with continuity and neutrality. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice 4, Caen 2005, and at the First Spain Italy Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory, Maastricht 2005. |
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