资源、激励与部门利益:中国社会保险征缴体制的纵贯研究(1999—2008)

筹资是社会保险制度运行的基础,而筹资机构的选择是社会保险制度设计的关键环节。在中国社会保险费征缴体制中,地方税务机构和社会保险经办机构并存,形成二元征缴局面。新通过的《社会保险法》也未能终结征缴主体之争。为什么这一权力分散的格局得以延续十余年?由谁征收社会保险费更有利于社会保险事业的发展?事实上,两种征缴方式各具优势,与征缴相对应的权力以及征缴所带来的资金流和人事编制才是双方相持不下的动因。本研究追踪了1999至2008年各省级单位征缴主体的变迁,并构建了一个历时10年的面板数据库。统计分析发现,地方税务机构征收社会保险费更有利于扩大社会保险覆盖面,有利于促进社会保险基金收入增长。作为独立的经验研究,分析结果有助于终结长达十余年的征缴主体之争;同时,部门利益的分析框架也可应用于对其他政府机构的分析。

Resources,Incentives and Sectoral Interests:A Longitudinal Study of the System of Collecting Social Insurance Contributions in China(1999-2008)

Financing is the foundation of a social insurance system,and the selection of collection agencies for social insurance contributions is crucial for system design and construction.Two types of collection agency co-exist in China:local taxation agencies and social insurance agencies.The newly approved Social Insurance Law has failed to resolve the competition between the two.Why has this duopoly lasted for more than a decade? And which agency would better serve the development of social insurance programs? In...