Strategic altruistic transfers and rent seeking within the family |
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Authors: | Yang-Ming Chang |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Kansas State University, 319 Waters Hall, Manhattan, KS 66506-4001, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper examines the rent-seeking behavior of “selfish” children in competing for parental transfers. The paper extends
Chang and Weisman (South Econ J 71:821–836, 2005), that focuses on compensated transfers, to allow for non-compensated transfers à la Buchanan (J Law Econ 26:71–85, 1983) and derives results for the case in which children’s time contributions as perceived by their parents are a merit good (e.g.,
service), pure waste (e.g., bugging), or a mix of both. For an increase in the proportion of time contributions that are pure
waste, parents find it optimal to reduce the size of an overall transfer, thereby lowering the levels of wasteful rent-seeking
activities by their children within the family.
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Keywords: | Strategic altruism Parental transfers Sibling rivalry Rent seeking |
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