| 事业单位管理体制创新中的委托——代理问题 |
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| 引用本文： | 黄雯. 事业单位管理体制创新中的委托——代理问题[J]. 北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）, 2009, (3): 62-64. |
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| 作者姓名： | 黄雯 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.西北政法大学经济管理学院, 西安 710063 |
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| 摘 要： | 相对于国有企业和政府机构改革的巨大进展而言，事业单位的管理体制改革滞后、效率低下的问题，至今困扰着我们。文章试图运用制度经济学的相关理论，厘清事业单位所涉及的委托代理关系，运用委托代理理论对事业单位、政府及个人的行为的激励约束分析，以期对事业单位的改革提供一个全新的分析视角。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 政府 事业单位 个人 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-09-18 |
The Problems of Principal-Agent in Innovation of Public Institution Management System |
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| HUANG Wen. The Problems of Principal-Agent in Innovation of Public Institution Management System[J]. Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology (Social Sciences Edition), 2009, (3): 62-64. |
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| Authors: | HUANG Wen |
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| Affiliation: | 1.College of Economy and Management, Northwest University of Politics and Law, Xi'an 710063 |
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| Abstract: | The reforms of state-owned enterprises and government institutions have made tremendous progress,but the reform of the management system of institutions has comparatively lagged behind,the problem of which has troubled us since.This paper,by applying the system of theoretical economics,attempts to clarify the agency relationship that relates institutions,and meanwhile by applying the principal-agent theory,analyzes the incentive and restraint that exist between the public institutions,governmental units and... |
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| Keywords: | principal-agent government public institutions individual |
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