授权模式下制造商与再制造商的演化博弈决策

鉴于专利授权对解决制造商与再制造商之间的利益冲突和知识产权问题的重要作用，构建专利授权模式下原产品制造商和第三方再制造商的演化博弈模型，分析制造商绿色创新决策与再制造商再制造决策的动态演化过程。研究表明，系统演化的均衡结果受再制造专利许可费的影响，当专利许可费满足不同的边界条件时，系统将演化至不同的稳定均衡策略。但是在单纯的授权模式下，制造商和再制造商构成的动态系统并不能演化至（绿色创新，再制造）的最佳均衡结果，因此需要政府层面的外部干预进行引导。从研究结果来看，存在可行的政府补贴机制，能够促使系统实现制造商进行绿色创新，再制造商积极开展再制造业务的最佳稳定均衡。

Evolutionary Game Decision between Manufacturer and Remanufacturer in the Authorization Mode

With the rapid development of remanufacturing industry, the conflicts of interest and intellectual property rights between manufacturers and remanufacturers become more and more prominent. To some extent, patent authorization can effectively reduce property rights disputes and is helpful in solving the interest conflicts issues. In order to explore the parties' evolutionary behaviors and dynamic equilibriums in the patent authorization mode, evolutionary game theory is used to study the decisions between original product manufacturers and third-party remanufacturers, and especially the influence of remanufacturing license fee on system's evolution equilibrium strategies is analyzed. The results show that the system will evolve to different stable equilibrium strategy when the remanufacturing license fee meets different boundary conditions. However, in the pure authorization mode only using remanufacturing license fee, the system can not evolve to the best equilibrium result (green innovation, remanufacturing). Therefore, the government's external intervention is further introduced to the model and the guidence effect of subsidy mechanism is investigated. The results prove that there is a feasible government subsidy mechanism, which can promote the system to achieve the best stable equilibrium. In that case, manufacturers are willing to make efforts in green innovation, thus reducing the remanufacturing costs, and remanufacturers are more willing to carry out remanufacturing business. The joint efforts of both sides will improve the efficiency and value of remanufacturing.