回收商参与的多阶段绿色闭环供应链竞争模型

本文在供应链中各企业均进行碳减排技术投资及政府干预产品回收的背景下，考虑旧产品转化为再制造产品的比率、政府的单位回收补贴及政府强制回收量等因素，建立了由制造商、货运商、零售商、消费市场和回收商组成的多阶段绿色闭环供应链竞争模型，其中各方均在考虑碳减排技术投入、政府的强制回收量、废旧产品转化率的同时追求各自的最大收益。在对各方决策行为进行分析的基础上，给出了各层级实现均衡的条件，并将之转化为混合互补问题来求解。研究表明，规划阶段数的增加有利于产品循环，从而实现资源的有效利用；随着规划阶段的增加，各级参与者均倾向于进行更高的绿色技术投入；旧产品的剩余价值越多，转化为再制造产品的比率就越大，制造商也更倾向于旧产品再制造；当强制回收量较低时，政府回收补贴对回收商的激励作用比较显著。

Competitive Model for Multistage Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Recyclers

Environmental problems including the greenhouse effect and shortage of energy are becoming severe. Reducing the carbon emission and saving resources in supply chain networks are regarded as an important issue in protecting the environment. Various carbon emission reduction technologies should be invested by all participants in supply chain networks and the process of product recycling should be intervened by the government. In this paper, based on these viewpoints, a competitive model composed by manufacturers, freight carriers, retailers, consumers, and recyclers for a multistage green closed-loop supply chain is presented. In the model, in consideration of the carbon emission reduction technologies, mandatory recycling amount from the government, and conversion rate of end-of-life products, the profit of each participant is maximized. According to the analysis of each participant's decision behavior, the equilibrium conditions are given and then transformed into a mixed complementarity problem. That is, the equilibrium strategies may be obtained by solving this mixed complementarity problem. The numerical results given in the paper reveal the following issues:(1) Product cycle may be stimulated due to the increasing number of stages in supply chain networks so as to raise the effective utilization of resources. (2) The amounts of green technology invested by the participants increase as the number of stages increases. (3) The more surplus value the end-of-life products exist, the higher ratio of the remanufactured product is and the more end-of-life products manufacturers are devoted to remanufacturers. (4) The incentives for recycling subsidies are more significant when the amount of mandatory recycling is lower.