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大气污染物排放权初始分配的区际协调方法研究
引用本文:王树强,刘赫,徐娜,孟娣.大气污染物排放权初始分配的区际协调方法研究[J].中国管理科学,2021,29(3):37-48.
作者姓名:王树强  刘赫  徐娜  孟娣
作者单位:河北工业大学经济管理学院, 天津 300401
基金项目:天津科技计划项目重点招标项目(17ZLDZF00130);河北省教育厅人文社会科学研究重大课题攻(ZD201717);高等学校人文社会科学项目研究(SD171046)
摘    要:落实大气污染跨区域联防联控政策的关键是科学划分区际减排责任,合理限定每一成员区域的排污限额,实现区域政府的自发减排。本文基于非合作博弈理论,构建同时满足收益约束和生态约束的区际大气污染物排放权初始分配模型,据此针对典型的三类区际经济关系求取了成员区域的排污限额纳什均衡解,并进行了实证检验。研究发现,工业化初期,成员区域最优分配量取决于各自无管制排污量,决策无需考虑区际互传。甘肃和新疆SO2实际排放量变动趋势与此吻合;工业化中前期,中心区率先工业化,其最优分配量由生态约束极值决定,但难以达到收益约束极值。外围区域的最优分配量同时满足了两约束极值,且由无管制排污量决定,四川和重庆的实证检验结果印证了此结论;工业化中后期,区域间决策互动明显,成员区域的最优分配量均由生态约束极值决定,但难以达到其收益约束极值。河北省和北京的实证分析结果与此一致。进一步分析发现,容量效应和传输效应分别是河北和北京的污染源,进一步强化两地的联防联控刻不容缓。

关 键 词:大气污染联防联控  排放权交易  初始分配  非合作博弈论  
收稿时间:2018-04-16
修稿时间:2019-01-03

Study on Interregional Coordination Method of Initial Allocation on Air Pollutant Emission Permits
WANG Shu-qiang,LIU He,XU Na,MENG Di.Study on Interregional Coordination Method of Initial Allocation on Air Pollutant Emission Permits[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2021,29(3):37-48.
Authors:WANG Shu-qiang  LIU He  XU Na  MENG Di
Institution:School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin 300401, China
Abstract:It is key to implement the policy of interregional joint prevention and control of air pollution into practice that the overall responsibility for emission reduction is scientifically divided to each member region, and the emission limits for each member region is confirmed reasonably to realize voluntary emission reduction. Based on non-cooperative game theory, the optimal allocation model of the emission rights which satisfy the income constraint and ecological constraint is construted. Then the corresponding Nash equilibrium solution showing the emission limits for each member region is solved for three typical economic relations between regions and the empirical tests are conducted.The conclusion shows that on initial stage of industrialization, the emission limits of the member region is their own non-regulated emissions,without regard to inter-regional transmission. The changing trend of SO2 actual emissions in Gansu and Xinjiang coincides with that. On the stage of the early and middle of industrialization, the emission limits of the central region industrialized firstly is depended on the extreme point satisfying ecological constraint,but can not reach the extreme point satisfying income constraint, the emission limits of the peripheral region is its non-regulated emissions reaching the extreme point satisfying income and ecological constraint which the changing trend of SO2 actual emissions in Sichuan and Chongqing coincides with. On the stage of the late and middle industrialization,the decision on the emission among regions is interacted obviously, the emission limits of all regions is depended on the extreme point satisfying ecological constraint,but can not reach the extreme point satisfying income constraint, and the changing trend of SO2 actual emissions in Hebei and Beijing coincides with that. Further analysis finds that the capacity effect is the pollution source of Hebei and the transmission effect is the pollution source of Beijing,and it is urgent to strengthen the joint prevention and control of air pollution between two places.
Keywords:interregional joint prevention and control of air pollution  air pollutant emission right trade  air pollutant emission right initial distribution  non-cooperative game theory  
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