基于采购商投资的双源采购与供应商定价决策

随着供应链的全球化发展，供应链成员企业的合作越来越紧密。许多采购商通过直接对供应商投资提高供应的可靠性或降低采购成本。本文研究双供应商-单采购商的两级供应链中采购商投资、供应商定价以及采购商采购决策。在此供应链中，供应商和采购商之间存在先后决策的Stackelberg博弈，供应商之间存在同时决策的贝特兰德博弈。本文考虑异质供应商，即供应成本与稳定性存在差异，接受采购商投资后两者的改进效应也不同，建立了采购商投资、供应商定价、采购商采购三阶段博弈模型，基于凸优化理论和博弈分析方法对问题进行分析，并应用邻域搜索的自适应差分计划算法对问题进行求解。研究了供应链成员企业的最优均衡决策，分析供应成本、供应稳定性以及投资改进效应对最优均衡决策的影响。

Procurement and Pricing Decisions in Dual-Sourcing Supply Chain with Buyer's Investment

With the globalization of supply chain, the competition between supply chains become more and more intense, cooperation among enterprises in supply chain are more closely. In practice, there have been many companies directly investing in its suppliers to encourage suppliers to improve their supply performance. Decision-making of the game between two suppliers and a buyer with the buyer investing in suppliers is considered in this paper. A general situation is considered in this paper that the suppliers are heterogeneous, namely that the two suppliers are different in supply stability, production cost and the improvement effect of investment. A three-stage game model is established in this paper. At the first stage, the buyer determines investment assignment for the two suppliers. At the second stage, after receiving the buyer's investment and improve supply process, the suppliers determine their supply prices. Then, at the third stage, the buyer determines the optimal order quantities from the two suppliers. The solution method for solving the established model is developed, and the influence on the optimal solution of supply stability, production cost and the improvement effect of investment is also analyzed. The obtained results provide some managerial insights for managing buyer's investment and procurement decisions in dual-sourcing supply chain.