“双随机、一公开”产品质量监管模型研究

在市场监管领域全面推行“双随机、一公开”监管，是党中央、国务院作出的重大决策部署，是市场监管理念和方式的重大创新。本文首次构建“双随机、一公开”产品质量监管的理论模型，理清“双随机”与“一公开”及各参与主体之间的作用关系，分析市场主体名录库和执法检查人员名录库中抽查企业与检查人员的群体行为演化机理，得出针对“双随机、一公开”监管的激励机制。研究发现：通过“双随机”抽取检查人员和抽查企业并“公开”产品质量信息，需配以恰当的激励机制才能有效制约抽检企业的假冒伪劣行为和检查人员的无效抽检行为；当公开声誉较高时，对检查人员实施质检激励或对抽查企业实施质量激励均可以使得系统良性演化，但如果公开声誉较低，需同时对检查人员和抽查企业实施质检与质量双重激励；质检激励机制设计时需对标准质量和假冒伪劣对应的检查人员分别给予质检激励，质量激励机制设计时需对有效抽检和无效抽检对应的抽查企业分别给予质量激励；质检激励和质量激励下系统稳定点的演化轨迹存在很大差异，质检激励先使得检查人员演化到有效抽检，然后通过公开声誉带动抽查企业演化到标准质量，而质量激励先使抽查企业演化到标准质量，然后通过公开声誉带动检查人员演化到有效抽检，如果公开声誉较低，这种传动机制会被阻断导致系统不会演化到理想状态。最后本文为完善和创新“双随机、一公开”监管提出了针对性的政策建议。

Product Quality Supervision Model of Random Inspections

‘Double Random, One Disclosure’ is an innovative supervision model which proposed by the government of China and pursued in the field of market supervision. An oversight model drawing on random inspections by randomly selected law enforcement officers or inspectors and requiring the prompt release of results.For the first time, the evaluation game theory is used to construct the theoretical analysis framework of ‘Double Random, One Disclosure’ product quality supervision, the relationship between ‘Random Inspections’ and ‘Release Information’ is clarified as well as participants, the group behavior evolution of enterprise in market entity list and inspectors in law enforcers list is analyzed, the incentive mechanism is raised for the supervision model. It is found that it's not enough to quash the quality false behavior and inefficient inspection behavior by ‘Double Random, One Disclosure’. Enforcing inspection incentives for inspectors or quality incentives for enterprise separately play a role in system benign evolution when the public reputation is high enough, otherwise the system needs to enforce inspection incentives and quality incentives at the same time. Designing inspection incentives need enforcing inspection incentives for inspectors of standard quality and quality fraud, designing quality incentive need enforce quality incentives for efficient and inefficient inspections. There are great differences in the evolution track of system stable points between inspection incentives and quality incentives. The inspection incentive makes inspectors evolve to efficient inspection, then drives enterprise evolve to standard quality by reputation effect, while quality incentive make enterprise evolve to standard quality, then drives inspectors evolve to efficient inspection by reputation effect, however, the system cannot evolve to ideal state because the transmission system be cut off with lower public reputation. Finally, some suggestions are made for the government to complete and innovate'Double Random, One Disclosure'supervision model. This new supervision model come from China is a radical innovation for product quality supervision management.