考虑双重异质性的碳配额分配及交易机制研究

构建包含政府-企业-消费者三方的碳配额分配及交易减排供应链，其中消费者基于自身低碳偏好进行产品选购，政府基于行业社会福利最优进行企业配额分配和碳指导价设定，企业基于利润最优进行生产和销售。通过建立混合博弈模型，对比分析了考虑企业和消费者双重异质性的配额分配及交易机制对政府、企业最优决策行为的影响。研究结果表明：该减排机制能在保持社会福利最优的基础上更好地提升消费者和企业的参与积极性，实现对异质企业的双向和持续性减排激励。消费者低碳偏好和单位碳排差异度是影响减排机制实施方案和实施绩效的关键因素，其中，消费者低碳偏好决定了行业最优碳价和配额分配规则，且在主动和被动两个层面影响企业决策和产品价格；单位碳排差异度是影响企业利润、消费者主动支付倾向和减排绩效的重要因素，严格的差异度划分有利于形成正向激励；差异化的配额率易于形成减排激励，其与自主配额率间的差异是造成碳价波动的原因之一；研究也表明，过低的单位碳排差异度不适合进行企业异质性划分，在减排机制设计中应弱化“碳收益激励”目的。

Carbon Quota Allowance & Trading Mechanism Considering Double Heterogeneity

Global warming has become an important obstacle to the sustainable development of the earth. The reduction of total and unit carbon emissions has become the core of national emission reduction mechanism design.Base on this, the carbon trading supply chain is composed of government, enterprises and consumers, in which consumers buy products based on their own low carbon preference, the government makes the quota and carbon guidance price based on the optimal principle of industrial social welfare, and enterprises are engaged in the production and sales under the constraints of emission reduction mechanisms. Through the establishment of a hybrid game model, the impact of the carbon emission reduction mechanismwas compares and analyzes, which considers the dual heterogeneity. The results show that the new emission reduction mechanism can better mobilize the participation enthusiasm of consumers and enterprises in the optimization of industrial social welfare, and achieve the two-way incentives of heterogeneous enterprises to reduce emissions. The key factors are the consumer low carbon preference and the unit carbon emission difference, which affect the scheme of implementation of the mechanism and the emission reduction performance. Consumers' low carbon preferences determine the industry's optimal carbon price and quota allocation rules, and affects corporate decision-making and product prices at both active and passive levels. The unit carbon emissions difference is an important factor affecting the direction of industry's emission reduction, enterprise profit and consumer's active payment. Strict division of unit carbon emissions is conducive to the improvement of emission reduction. The quota rate is an important factor in achieving emission reduction incentives, and the difference between the quota rate and the independent quota rate is one of the causes of fluctuations in carbon price. The research also shows that too low unit carbon emission difference is not suitable forthe division of enterprise heterogeneity, and the "carbon benefit incentive" should be weakened.