Strategy versus sincerity in mean voting |
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Authors: | Carla Marchese Marcello Montefiori |
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Institution: | a Dept. of Public Policy and Public Choice Polis, Univ. of Eastern Piedmont, Via Cavour 84, 15100 Alessandria, Italy b DIEM, Via Vivaldi 5, University of Genova, Italy |
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Abstract: | This paper focuses on the mean vote procedure for choosing the quantity of a public good, a social choice rule that selects the mean of the quantities voted for. The available theoretical models of mean voting give rise to conflicting predictions about the extent of the strategic bias that might arise in the individual vote. An experiment has been run in order to assess whether the participants disclose their (induced) preferences in voting or whether they strategically manipulate their vote, and in the latter case, which variables impact upon the likelihood of strategic bias and to what extent. |
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Keywords: | C91 D72 |
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