代理人努力决策柔性的分成制委托代理模型

针对被忽视的代理人努力决策的柔性,在第0期完全信息条件下建立了基于柔性的代理人努力决策模型和委托人的最优分成制合同设计模型,证明了最优分成比例在柔性决策行为假定下的存在性,并与经典的委托-代理模型的结论进行对比分析.结果表明,努力决策柔性将会提高努力所要求的临界市场价格;最优分成比例随着代理人的努力成本增加而增加,随着市场价格的期望增长率和努力的产量的增加而减小,但不会随着市场价格的波动率的增加而降低;当市场状况差时,经典的委托代理理论给出的分成比例将会给予代理人过高的支付.

Sharecropping principle-agent model with agent's flexible effort decision

Focusing on the ignorance of the flexibility of the agent's effort in decision, this paper biulds a model of agent's flexible effort decision model and a model of principle's design of sharecropping contract in the case of complete period-0 information, manages to prove the existence of the optimal sharecropping fraction, and compares the conclusions with those derived from the classical principle-agent models. The results show that the flexibility of an agent's effort in decision raises the threshold value...