首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

人力资本显性激励与隐性激励的组合合同分析
引用本文:陈爽英,唐小我,马永开.人力资本显性激励与隐性激励的组合合同分析[J].中国管理科学,2005,13(6):108-112.
作者姓名:陈爽英  唐小我  马永开
作者单位:1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆, 400044;2. 电子科技大学管理学院, 成都, 610054
基金项目:高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助课题(20030614011);国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(79725002)
摘    要:本文主要是对企业家人力资本基于主观业绩的隐性激励合同与客观业绩的显性激励合同的组合激励进行的研究。文中首先分别提出显性激励合同模型与隐性激励合同模型,随之在静态分析的基础上,深入分析组合激励合同模型中相关参数的变化含义,并说明组合激励合同的意义:在一定约束下,可同时增加企业家和所有者的期望收入。

关 键 词:隐性激励合同  显性激励合同  人力资本  企业家  
文章编号:1003-207(2005)06-0108-05
收稿时间:2004-06-08;
修稿时间:2004年6月8日

Studies on Combination Contract of Explicit and Implicit Incentives to Human Capital
CHEN Shuang-ying,TANG Xiao-wo,MA Yong-kai.Studies on Combination Contract of Explicit and Implicit Incentives to Human Capital[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2005,13(6):108-112.
Authors:CHEN Shuang-ying  TANG Xiao-wo  MA Yong-kai
Institution:1. Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;2. University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China
Abstract:The paper analyses combinative incentive contract,including implicit incentive contract based on subjective performance and explicit contract based on objective performance to entrepreneur human capital.The implicit incentive contract and explicit incentive contract models are given firstly.On the base of static analysis,the change meaning of relative parameters in the model is deeply discussed and the significance of combination incentive contract is that the expected gains of the entrepreneur and the owner are increased under the restraints.
Keywords:implicit incentive contract  explicit incentive contract  human capital  entrepreneur  
本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《中国管理科学》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《中国管理科学》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号