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传统认识之谜与胡塞尔的解答
引用本文:尚党卫. 传统认识之谜与胡塞尔的解答[J]. 江苏科技大学学报(自然科学版), 2004, 4(4): 12-16
作者姓名:尚党卫
作者单位:江苏大学,人文学院,江苏,镇江,212013
基金项目:江苏大学人文社科基金项目(JDR2003016)
摘    要:本体论哲学有着难以克服的认识论难题。尽管近代哲学自觉地把认识论问题作为自己讨论的中心课题,但认识论难题依然以变样的二元分立方式挥之不去。因此,对于胡塞尔来说,进行认识批判就意味以现象学直观的方式超越哲学史上形形色色的二元分立模式。沟通一般与个别、超越主—客关系模式的本质直观之所以可能,是因为在其中隐匿地发生着意向行为的赋义过程。这种赋义之所以不是主观唯心主义,是因为在内在时间中纯粹体验总是超出了"原初印象"。这样,在胡塞尔看来,"认识"并不是一个可以盛装外在对象的空口袋,相反,每一原初明证的直观就是确切意义上的认识。

关 键 词:认识之谜  胡塞尔  解答
文章编号:1673-0453(2004)04-0012-05
修稿时间:2004-07-01

Traditional Puzzle of Epistemology and the Answer of Edmund Husserl
SHANG Dang-wei. Traditional Puzzle of Epistemology and the Answer of Edmund Husserl[J]. Jiangsu University of Science and Technology:Social Science Edition, 2004, 4(4): 12-16
Authors:SHANG Dang-wei
Abstract:Ontology has some unconquerable difficult problems on the theory of knowledge. Though modern philosophy takes epistemology as the core of its discussion for granted, the problems are still unconquerable. So, to Husserl, knowledge critique means exceeding historical dualism in epistemology by his Phenomenological intuition. This Phenomenological intuition is not subjectivism because in inner consciousness noesis will appear when the noema accrue. Meanwhile, in the eyes of Husserl, "knowledge" is not an empty bag, on the contrary, every initial intuition is actually the meaning of knowledge.
Keywords:puzzle of epistemology  Edmund Husserl  answer
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