虚构话语的逻辑地位

塞尔认为可以从言语行为理论对"以言行事行为"的规定展开对"虚构"的哲学定义。通过与非虚构话语的对比,塞尔发现虚构话语不具备正常断言式以言行事行为所必须的基本原则、准备原则和真诚原则,进而推论虚构行为并非真正的以言行事行为,而是一种"伪装"的以言行事行为。在塞尔看来,虚构行为是一种特别的语言游戏,需要一种特别的惯例。而这种语言游戏并不能涵盖所有的以言行事的语言游戏,而只是对后者的一种寄生。

The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse

In John Searle’ view the speech-act theory can help to deal with the problem of defining fictional discourse philosophically.Comparing with non-fictional discourse Searle finds that because the acts of fiction lack the semantic and pragmatic rules for making an assertion it cannot be real illocutionary act but "pretend" to be certain illocutionary act.Finally Searle regards the fictional act as a kind of special language game with distinctive conventions.Fiction’s special game rules are different with the general illocutionary acts but parasitic on the latter.