首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


On the political economy of social security and public education
Authors:Panu Poutvaara
Institution:(1) Department of Economics, University of Helsinki, Arkadiankatu 7, P.O. Box 17, 00014 Helsinki, Finland
Abstract:This paper analyzes simultaneous voting on the wage tax rate and investment in public education with three overlapping generations and ability differences inside each cohort. Wage tax revenue finances public education and social security benefits. The presence of ability differences introduces a time-consistency problem with repeated voting. This can be solved by trigger strategies, which do not punish upward deviations in the wage tax rate. If there are multiple equilibria, then higher tax rates are associated with more education. Surprisingly, the median voter may be a young citizen, even when cohorts are of the same size.
Contact InformationPanu PoutvaaraEmail: Fax: +358-9-19128736
Keywords:Social security  Public education  Voting
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号